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I. INTRODUCTION
Texas courts continue to examine frequently-litigated franchising is-
sues, and this Survey period produced a “blockbuster” development con-
cerning joint-employer liability in the franchise context: the imposition of
vicarious liability on the franchisor for labor law violations asserted by a
franchisee’s employees against the franchisee. In response to the National
Labor Relations Board’s recent decision to classify franchisors as joint-
employers with their franchisees, the Texas Legislature passed a bill re-
stricting such classification only to situations where the franchisor exer-
cises direct control over those employees beyond what is necessary to
protect the franchisor’s brand. Other Texas cases during this Survey pe-
riod provide guidance for franchisors on a number of procedural issues—
including personal jurisdiction, choice-of-law, arbitration, and jury waiver
provisions—and courts also continue to define the contours of common
law and statutory claims in the unique franchising model.
II. PROCEDURE
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Two recent cases considered questions of personal jurisdiction in the
context of minimum contacts with the State of Texas. In Great American
Food Chain, Inc. v. Andreottola, the plaintiff was a Nevada company with
its principal place of business in Texas that had hired Andreottola, a
Georgia resident, as its president and director.1 Andreottolla later alleg-
edly “sought and obtained a position with defendants American
Franchise Capital and Apple Central” (AFC defendants), who were re-
sidents of Delaware, Connecticut, and Kansas.2 The plaintiff sued Andre-
ottola and the AFC defendants in Texas for, inter alia, breach of contract
and tortious interference with an existing contract.3 After removing the
case to federal court, the AFC defendants then moved to dismiss the case
for lack of personal jurisdiction.4
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas focused on
specific personal jurisdiction, considering whether the non-resident de-
fendants had established minimum contacts in Texas by either (1) pur-
posefully availing themselves of the benefits of conducting activities in
Texas; or (2) purposely directing their activities at residents in Texas such
that the alleged injuries arose from those activities.5 The only alleged
contacts that the AFC defendants had with Texas were the effects of the
AFC defendants’ alleged tortious interference between the plaintiff and
Andreottola.6 However, “in a commercial tort situation[,] the place of the
1. Great Am. Food Chain, Inc. v. Andreottola, No. 3:14-CV-1727-L, 2015 WL
493758, at *1, *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id. at *1.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *2.
6. Id.
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injury will usually be deemed to be the place where the critical events
associated with the dispute took place.”7 In this particular case, the court
found that none of the crucial events among the defendants occurred in
Texas.8 Moreover, the defendants must have purposefully directed their
activities to Texas to establish minimum contacts.9 Here, Andreottola’s
contract was set to be performed in Georgia, and the injurious acts (i.e.,
the AFC defendants’ negotiations with Andreottola) did not take place in
Texas.10 The district court held these facts were “insufficient to confer
specific jurisdiction” and dismissed the case.11
Great American serves as a reminder that personal jurisdiction cannot
be established where the only minimum contacts stemmed from the
plaintiff’s residence and suffering of harm in the forum.12 Instead, the
defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the benefits of, or di-
rected its activities to, the forum state.13
SGIC Strategic Global Investment Capital, Inc. v. Burger King Europe
GMBH (SGIC I) presents another example of minimum contacts that
will not confer personal jurisdiction.14 In SGIC I, the plaintiffs (various
interconnected entities and their shareholder) owned and operated Bur-
ger King franchises in Germany through various franchise agreements,
and the franchise fee payments were personally guaranteed by plaintiff
Christian Groenke (Groenke)—the sole shareholder of SGIC Strategic
Global Investment Capital, Inc. (SGIC).15 The plaintiffs alleged that Bur-
ger King induced Groenke to purchase shares of a certain corporation “in
exchange for a development agreement and the opportunity to purchase
[several] Burger King restaurants.”16 But Burger King later terminated
the agreement and sold the restaurants to others.17 When the plaintiffs’
non-performing restaurants fell into bankruptcy, Groenke attempted to
sell his shares in plaintiff SGIC to another buyer. Plaintiffs alleged that
the deal fell through due to Burger King’s contacts with the buyer.18
While Burger King sued Groenke in Texas for franchise fees based on his
personal guaranty, the plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit against Burger
King in Texas for tortious interference with a contract.19 Burger King re-
sponded by moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and on
7. Id. at *5 (quoting Jobe v. ATR Mktg., Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *3, *7.
11. Id. at *7.
12. Id. at *5 (citing Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002)).
13. Andreottola, 2015 WL 493758, at *6.
14. SGIC Strategic Glob. Inv. Capital, Inc. v. Burger King Europe GMBH, No. 3:14-
CV-3300-B, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89501 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2015) [hereinafter SGIC I].
Haynes and Boone served as co-counsel for Burger King in this matter.
15. Id. at *2–3.
16. Id. at *3.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *4.
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forum non conveniens grounds, and plaintiffs sought leave to conduct ju-
risdictional discovery.20
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed with
Burger King, finding that the plaintiffs “failed to make a preliminary
showing of specific jurisdiction.”21 The district court, however, also noted
that “[v]oluntarily filing a lawsuit may constitute purposeful availment
and subject a party to personal jurisdiction in another lawsuit when the
lawsuits arise from the same general transaction.”22 The plaintiffs argued
that Burger King had submitted to personal jurisdiction in Texas by filing
a lawsuit against Groenke, which Groenke argued was related to the pre-
sent suit because he would never have entered the franchise agreement if
not for Burger King’s promises regarding the development agreement.23
The district court, however, rejected plaintiffs’ argument, finding that the
present suit concerned Burger King’s “alleged tortious interference with
the sale of” Groenke’s interest in SGIC—not Burger King’s alleged ac-
tions regarding failed promises in the development agreement.24 Because
the two lawsuits did not arise from the same transaction, the district court
ruled that Burger King had not purposefully availed itself of Texas’s
jurisdiction.25
SGIC I makes clear that the mere act of filing a separate lawsuit in a
forum state does not, in itself, automatically confer jurisdiction upon that
party in a different lawsuit. Even if that lawsuit stems from a related set
of facts, both lawsuits must arise from the same general transaction within
that set of facts.
B. CHOICE OF LAW
Gator Apple, LLC v. Apple Texas Restaurants, Inc. involved a choice-
of-law provision dictating which state law should be applied to a breach
of contract claim.26 Gator Apple assumed a Florida franchise agreement
with Applebee’s. The agreement contained a choice-of-law provision
prohibiting either party from soliciting the other’s former employees
within six months of their previous employment without first obtaining
written consent.27 In an unrelated transaction, Apple Texas also became a
franchisee of Applebee’s in North Texas.28 Eventually, Gator Apple
hired five former employees of Apple Texas without first obtaining a let-
ter of release from Apple Texas.29 Apple Texas, acting as a third-party
beneficiary of Gator Apple’s franchise agreement, sued Gator Apple for
20. Id.
21. Id. at *8, *10.
22. Id. at *8.
23. Id. at *8, *10.
24. Id. at *10–11.
25. Id.
26. Gator Apple, LLC v. Apple Tex. Rest., Inc., 442 S.W.3d 521, 530–31 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2014, pet. denied).
27. Id. at 525–26.
28. Id. at 526.
29. Id. at 528.
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breach of contract for violations of the employment provision of Gator
Apple’s franchise agreement.30 Apple Texas then moved for summary
judgment, which the trial court granted and found, inter alia, that Kansas
law governed the franchise agreement.31 After the trial court entered fi-
nal judgment for Apple Texas, Gator Apple filed a motion for a new trial.
The trial court overruled the motion, and Gator Apple appealed.32
The Dallas Court of Appeals found that the trial court correctly ap-
plied Kansas law to the breach of contract claim as well as to the
franchise agreement’s liquidated damages provision.33 First, the choice-
of-law provision stated that Kansas law applied to the construction of the
agreement and all questions arising with reference to it.34 The court of
appeals found that this provision, coupled with its stated purpose to en-
sure that all Applebee’s franchise agreements be “uniformly interpreted,”
indicated the parties’ “clear intent for the franchise agreement to be uni-
formly interpreted” across all similar franchise agreements with Ap-
plebee’s.35 Because the question of whether the contract was breached
arose with reference to the agreement, the breach of contract claim was
covered by the choice-of-law provision, and Kansas law applied to the
claim.36
Second, the court of appeals considered Gator Apple’s argument that,
“even if the parties intended for Kansas law to apply to the performance
of the franchise agreement,” a choice-of-law analysis required the appli-
cation of Texas law, particularly because Kansas law conflicted with Texas
policy regarding the liquidated damages provision.37 The court of appeals
rejected this argument and concluded that the mere fact that the applica-
tion of one state’s law may lead to a different result does not mean it is
contrary to the fundamental policy of the forum state.38 Instead, the court
of appeals turned to the Restatement to evaluate the express choice-of-
law provision.39 According to § 187(1) of the Restatement, a contractual
choice-of-law provision must be applied unless the specific issue is one
that could be resolved by an explicit provision.40 Because the enforceabil-
ity of a contract cannot be resolved by an explicit provision, the court of
appeals found that the exception in § 187(1) did not apply.41 Section
187(2) also requires that a contractual choice-of-law provision be applied
unless either “the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the par-
ties” or the application of the chosen state’s law would be “contrary to
30. Id. at 529.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 529–30.
33. Id. at 534–35.
34. Id. at 530.
35. Id. at 531.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater inter-
est.”42 The court of appeals found that Kansas had “a substantial rela-
tionship to the parties and the transaction” because Applebee’s was
headquartered in Kansas when Gator Apple entered the franchise agree-
ment and Applebee’s had to perform its obligations under the franchise
agreement in Kansas.43 By contrast, Texas had “no relationship with the
franchise agreement at the time it was signed.”44 Gator Apple urged the
court of appeals to consider the relationship that Texas had to the case
given that Gator Apple hired Apple Texas employees.45 But the court of
appeals found no authority to support the argument that the court should
consider the facts existing at the time of breach.46 Thus, the court of ap-
peals concluded that Kansas law applied to the breach of contract claim
because no state had a more significant relationship at the time the con-
tract was executed.47
Gator Apple reflects the importance of timing as it relates to a choice-
of-law provision. Although a party’s actions may involve the forum state
after the execution of an agreement, the analysis focuses on the facts at
the time the parties signed the contract—“contracts should be governed
by the law the parties had in mind when the contract was made.”48
C. FORUM SELECTION
Pritchett v. Gold’s Gym Franchising, LLC concerned the issue of
whether a forum selection clause was incorporated by reference into a
guaranty agreement.49 In this case, Pritchett’s daughter and her husband,
on behalf of their corporation, entered into a franchise agreement with
Gold’s Gym for a Georgia location, which all three individuals, including
Pritchett, personally guaranteed.50 The parties later entered into a new
franchise agreement, which contained a provision consenting to the juris-
diction of federal courts in Dallas County, Texas.51 Pritchett’s son-in-law,
as president of the corporation, signed the new franchise agreement, and
all three individuals signed the guaranty agreement (which Pritchett later
denied).52 Gold’s Gym later filed suit against Pritchett, his daughter, and
her husband for failure to pay franchise fees owed.53 Asserting that he
had no contacts with Texas, Pritchett filed a special appearance, but the
42. Id. at 532–33 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187(2)(a), (b) (Am. Law. Inst. 1989)).
43. Id. at 533.
44. Id. at 534.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 534–35.
48. Id. at 534 (quoting Sonat Expl. Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control Inc., 271 S.W.3d 228,
236 (Tex. 2008)).
49. Pritchett v. Gold’s Gym Franchising, LLC, No. 05-13-00464-CV, 2014 WL 465450,
at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 4, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *4–5.
53. Id. at *2.
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trial court denied the special appearance.54
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, finding
that Pritchett was subject to the forum selection clause because of the
guaranty agreement.55 Because a forum selection clause is prima facie
valid, a party opposing the clause’s enforcement bears a heavy burden of
arguing against enforcement.56 Pritchett argued that the forum selection
clause did not apply to him because he did not sign the franchise agree-
ment containing the forum selection clause.57 The forum selection clause,
however, explicitly applied to the “Owners” named in an attached exhibit
to the agreement, which listed Pritchett’s name.58 Also, the guaranty
agreement stated that the “Guarantors” (which the franchise agreement
had defined as any “Owner” having a certain ownership interest in the
corporation) “agree[d] to be personally bound by . . . each and every
provision in the [franchise] [a]greement.”59 Pritchett initialed the owner-
ship list and signed the guaranty agreement.60 The court of appeals found
that the language of the guaranty agreement reflected the parties’ intent
for the franchise agreement and forum selection clause to be part of the
guaranty agreement.61 Because the forum selection clause was incorpo-
rated by reference, it made no difference that Pritchett did not sign the
franchise agreement containing the forum selection clause.62 As a named
“Owner,” Pritchett was bound by the forum selection clause and waived
any objection.63 While Pritchett argued that his signature on the guaranty
agreement was forged, the court of appeals adhered to the trial court’s
finding that Pritchett signed the agreement and denied the special
appearance.64
Pritchett serves as a reminder that a non-signatory to a franchise agree-
ment may still be bound if the party has signed a guaranty agreement
incorporating the franchise agreement by reference.65 Thus, even an un-
signed document may become part of the contract if the language reflects
the parties’ intent to do so.66
In the SGIC I case, discussed above for its personal jurisdiction issues,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas also considered
whether it could and should assert jurisdiction over the defendant in light
54. Id.
55. Id. at *6.
56. Id. at *3 (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 17, 19
(1972)).
57. Id. at *4.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *4–5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *5.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *6.
64. Id.
65. See id. at *6 (citing In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. 2010)).
66. See id. at *5 (citing One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d
258, 267 (5th Cir. 2011); In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d at 567).
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of a forum selection clause (SGIC II).67 The franchise agreements at issue
contained a forum selection clause that named Munich, Germany as the
forum for the litigation of any disputes between the parties.68 After Bur-
ger King filed suit against Groenke in Texas for franchise fees due under
a guaranty agreement with Groenke, Groenke and the other plaintiffs
sued Burger King in the same court for tortious interference with a con-
tract.69 Burger King then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens based on the forum selection clause contained
within the franchise agreements.70
The district court examined the forum selection clause under the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, the legal mechanism for cases in which the
transferee court is not within the federal court system.71 The district court
considered the motion under the following guidelines: (1) a plaintiff’s
choice of forum is irrelevant to the court’s analysis; (2) the court should
disregard the parties’ private interest arguments; and (3) if “‘a party has
disregarded the forum selection clause and filed suit in a different forum,’
a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry with it the original venue’s
choice-of-law rules’ which may, in some circumstances, affect a district
court’s evaluation of the public interest factors.”72 Similar to its previous
jurisdictional analysis, the district court found that Burger King did not
intend to waive its right to enforce the forum selection clause by filing
suit against the plaintiff in Texas.73 Although the franchise agreements
contained a forum selection clause, the guaranty contract under which
Burger King sued Groenke did not contain that clause.74 Because Burger
King sued Groenke under that distinct guaranty agreement, the district
court held that Burger King could not have intended to waive its right to
enforce the forum selection clause in the franchise agreements.75
Further, the district court found that the forum selection clause applied
to all plaintiffs even though only plaintiff Groenke signed the franchise
agreements.76 “First, plaintiffs SGIC and GRIL directly benefitted from
[Burger King’s] performance under the franchise agreements” with
Groenke.77 Second, the plaintiffs’ claims could be determined only by re-
ferring to certain provisions of the franchise agreements, so plaintiffs
SGIC and GRIL could not selectively rely on those parts of the franchise
agreements without being subject to the agreements’ forum selection
67. SGIC Strategic Glob. Inv. Capital, Inc. v. Burger King Europe GMBH, No. 3:14-
cv-03300-B, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2015) [hereinafter SGIC II].
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 4; SGIC I, No. 3:14-CV-3300-B, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89501 (N.D. Tex. July
9, 2015).
70. SGIC II, No. 3:14-cv-03300-B, slip op. at 1.
71. Id. at 8 (citing Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of
Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 579–80 (2013)).
72. Id. at 10.
73. Id. at 20.
74. Id. at 20–21.
75. Id. at 21.
76. Id. at 21, 23.
77. Id. at 23.
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clause.78 Finally, the district court held that Germany’s interest in resolv-
ing local disputes and the district court’s avoidance of issues regarding
conflict of laws or the application of foreign law weighed against keeping
the suit in the Texas forum.79 Accordingly, the district court granted Bur-
ger King’s motion to dismiss.80
SGIC II presents another example of the strong tendency to enforce a
valid and agreed forum selection clause. As with Pritchett, SGIC II shows
that even non-signatories to a franchise agreement may be bound by any
of its forum clauses, especially when the non-signatories have directly
benefited from the other party’s performance under the agreement.
D. CLASS ACTIONS
In Aguayo v. Bassam Odeh, Inc., plaintiffs were current or former fast
food employees at the Jack in the Box restaurant owned and operated by
the defendants.81 The defendants also had ownership interest in other
companies that owned and operated Jack in the Box and Qdoba
franchises.82 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants regularly required
them to work more than 40 hours per week without overtime compensa-
tion by falsely crediting the hours to fictitious employees and threatening
to have the plaintiffs deported if they complained.83 The plaintiffs filed
suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and asserted claims on
behalf of similarly situated fast food employees who had worked for the
defendants in the past three years in Texas and Louisiana and who were
not paid for hours worked overtime.84
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas examined
the presented evidence according to the following evidentiary require-
ments for the class certification of similarly situated aggrieved
individuals:
(1) there is a reasonable basis for crediting the assertion that ag-
grieved individuals exist; (2) those aggrieved individuals are similarly
situated to the plaintiff[s] in relevant aspects given the claims and
defenses asserted; and (3) those individuals want to opt in to the
lawsuit.85
But a court will not certify a class if the claim arises from “purely per-
sonal” circumstances.86
First, the district court found that plaintiffs had stated a claim for the
78. Id. at 24.
79. Id. at 26.
80. Id.
81. Aguayo v. Bassam Odeh, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-2951-B, 2014 WL 737314, at *1 (N.D.




85. Id. at *2–3 (quoting Morales v. Thang Hung Corp., No. 4:08-2795, 2009 WL
2524601, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009)).
86. Id. at *3 (quoting Tolentino v. C & J Spec-Rent Servs. Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 642,
647 (S.D. Tex. 2010)).
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aggrieved individuals by alleging that they were denied overtime pay.87
The plaintiffs provided declarations identifying the fictitious employees
used and alleging that the defendants applied this policy to all Hispanic
employees.88 Additionally, the defendants acknowledged that the same
manager—accused of making threats—also worked at other franchise lo-
cations; accordingly, the court found that there was a reasonable basis for
concluding that other aggrieved individuals existed.89
Second, plaintiffs detailed their duties as fast food employees and
claimed to have worked at several other franchise locations.90 Coupled
with the fraudulent pay scheme using fictitious employees, the district
court found that there was sufficient evidence to indicate that similarly
situated individuals existed in this case.91
Third, based on the prior reasons, the district court found that similarly
situated individuals would want to opt into the lawsuit.92 Plaintiffs’ decla-
rations stated that they knew of other individuals who had also been de-
nied overtime pay and argued that “courts have allowed for class
certification without either the submission of statements from similarly
situated employees or affidavits from named plaintiffs that provide spe-
cific information about other employees.”93
Despite the above reasons, the district court found that the plaintiffs’
proposed class was too broad without evidence indicating that the fraudu-
lent pay scheme existed in restaurants in Louisiana or throughout
Texas.94 Instead, the evidence only showed that the plaintiffs and the
manager who had threatened the plaintiffs had all worked in various
franchise locations owned and operated by the defendants or by compa-
nies in which the defendants had an interest.95 The district court limited
the prospective class to current and former employees who had been de-
nied overtime pay and had worked at specific franchise locations identi-
fied by the plaintiffs.96
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas in
Pacheco v. Aldeeb conditionally certified a class based on minimal evi-
dence of similarly situated aggrieved individuals who might want to join
the lawsuit.97 The plaintiffs were food service workers at fast food
franchise restaurants. Two of the plaintiffs worked as managers in differ-








94. Id. at *5.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Pacheco v. Aldeeb, No. 5:14-CV-121-DAE, 2015 WL 1509570, at *8 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2015).
98. Id. at *1.
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compensate them for overtime, required unpaid work outside of their
shifts, and made unlawful deductions from their paychecks in violation of
the FLSA.99 The plaintiffs sought conditional class certification of current
and former employees who had worked in the defendants’ franchise
stores in Bexar and Kendall Counties within the three years preceding
the suit.100
As in Aguayo, the district court used a three-step analysis to determine
whether to certify the proposed class.101 The district court, however,
noted that its determination at that stage was made “using a fairly lenient
standard because the court generally has minimal evidence and because
[t]he remedial nature of the FLSA . . . militate[s] strongly in favor of
allowing cases to proceed collectively.”102 And, affidavits and declara-
tions based on personal knowledge are acceptable forms of evidence, re-
gardless of whether such evidence would be admissible at trial.103 The
plaintiffs offered three declarations of employees who worked at some of
the franchise locations, were not paid for their overtime work, and had
spoken with other similarly situated employees.104 The plaintiffs also al-
leged that the defendants’ policies of denying overtime pay applied to
many (if not all) employees. The plaintiffs presented paystubs indicating
that they had not received overtime pay.105 Based on this evidence, the
district court found that the plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to
support their allegations and to establish that aggrieved individuals
existed.106
The district court ultimately found that only two of the plaintiffs were
similarly situated to the proposed class, while the third plaintiff was
not.107 In its analysis, the district court determined whether the individu-
als executed the same basic tasks and experienced the same pay prac-
tices.108 The district court held that two of the plaintiffs were similarly
situated because they received the same hourly compensation, performed
duties similar to those performed by non-supervisory employees, and
faced the same policies of non-payment for overtime work.109 On the
other hand, the district court found that plaintiff Pacheco was not simi-
larly situated because he had worked as an area manager, supervised op-
erations for several locations, and was authorized to make personnel
99. Id. at *1–2.
100. Id. at *2–3.
101. Id. at *3–8.
102. Id. at *2 (quoting Lee v. Metrocare Servs., 980 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759 (N.D. Tex.
2013); Tolentino v. C & J Servs. Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103. Pacheco, 2015 WL 1509570, at *3–4.
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *4–5.
107. Id. at *6.
108. Id. (quoting Tice v. AOC Senior Home Health Corp., 826 F. Supp. 2d 990, 996
(E.D. Tex. 2011)).
109. Id.
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decisions.110 Although serving in a managerial role does not, standing
alone, preclude one from representing non-managerial employees,
Pacheco had markedly different responsibilities, was paid on a unique
bonus compensation plan, and was initially hired by the defendants as an
independent contractor.111 Accordingly, the district court found that
Pacheco could proceed as an individual plaintiff but could not join the
class.112
Finally, the district court found that the plaintiffs established that other
aggrieved individuals would join the suit by presenting minimal evi-
dence—plaintiffs’ declarations referring to over 100 employees that had
worked at some of the locations.113 In fact, two opt-in plaintiffs had al-
ready filed notices to join the suit.114 The district court also allowed the
plaintiffs to send notice of the class action by posting notices in the de-
fendants’ franchise locations.115 While the defendants objected that such
postings would damage their reputation, the district court noted that the
notice should be placed at a location readily accessible only to the de-
fendants’ employees, not its customers.116
Aguayo and Pacheco are similar cases but with one key difference: the
district court excluded plaintiff Pacheco because his duties and pay were
not sufficiently similar to the other plaintiffs in the suit and to the mem-
bers of the proposed class.117 Pacheco indicates that although some man-
agerial employees may remain in a class with non-managerial employees,
the line drawn depends upon the specific duties and pay scheme of each
individual plaintiff. While the evidentiary standard is low, a court may
still exclude an individual plaintiff from a class action if that plaintiff’s
circumstances are not sufficiently similar to the proposed class members.
E. ARBITRATION
As arbitration provisions are common in franchise agreements, courts
continue to explore the scope of those provisions to determine which
claims may be litigated. In DXP Enterprises v. Goulds Pumps, Inc., the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas traversed the issue
110. Id.
111. Id. at *6–7 (citing Aguilar v. Complete Landsculpture, Inc., No. 3:04 CV 0776 D,
2004 WL 2293842, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2004)).
112. Id. at *7 (citing Tolentino v. C & J Spec-Rent Servs. Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Requiring a prospective class to share similar job requirements and pay
provisions ensures the economy of scale and judicial efficiency envisioned by the FLSA by
avoiding the need for individualized inquiries into whether a defendant’s policy violates
the FLSA as to some employees but not others.”)).
113. Id. at *8.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *9.
116. Id. Previous courts have even approved posting notice in newspapers and radio
advertisements over objections of reputational damage. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Mech.
Tech. Servs., Inc., 299 F.R.D. 154, 156–57 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Romero v. Producers Dairy
Foods, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 474, 493 (E.D. Cal. 2005); Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 531 F.
Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1982)).
117. Id. at *6.
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of whether an arbitration provision containing an exception for equitable
remedies allowed a party to seek a permanent injunction in court.118
DXP, an industrial equipment dealer, signed a distributor agreement with
Goulds, a manufacturer of pumps, parts, and accessories.119 The distribu-
tor agreement contained an arbitration clause that covered any contro-
versy or claims “arising out of or related to” the agreement.120 When the
relationship between the parties soured, Goulds sought to terminate the
agreement and demanded arbitration.121 DXP responded with a lawsuit
and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent termina-
tion without statutory notice or good cause.122 The parties agreed to stay
termination pending arbitration, and the district court denied the prelimi-
nary injunction.123
The district court then considered DXP’s motion for a permanent in-
junction under federal policy and statutes favoring arbitration.124 DXP’s
ability to seek a permanent injunction through litigation depended upon
whether its claim fell under any exception within the arbitration clause.125
While broadly covering claims arising out of or related to the agreement,
the arbitration provision also allowed either party to seek “an equitable
remedy (such as a Restraining Order or Injunction)” in court.126 In cases
involving similar contractual language, courts have held that under this
exemption a party may seek a “temporary injunctive relief to maintain
the status quo” but cannot do so if it “would require the court to consider
and decide the merits of a[ ] . . . claim” that could otherwise be arbi-
trated.127 Instead, courts have required “the most forceful evidence” to
allow parties to litigate all claims for injunctive relief that would other-
wise appear before the arbitrator.128 Thus, “[a]ribtration agreements that
lack such unambiguous language and simply state that parties can ask
courts for injunctive relief ‘notwithstanding’ an agreement to arbitrate do
not sufficiently show that claims for permanent injunctive relief are non-
arbitrable.”129 Because the distributor agreement did not contain clear
118. DXP Enters. v. Goulds Pumps, Inc, No. H-14-1112, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156158,
at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014).
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *4–5.
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id. at *5–6.
124. Id. at *7–8.
125. See id. at *9–11.
126. Id. at *3, *9.
127. Id. at *11–12 (citing Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277,
1281–82, 1285 (9th Cir. 2009); WMT Inv’rs, LLC v. Visionwall Corp, No. 09-CIV-10509-
RMB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65869, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010); Clarus Med., LLC v.
Myelotec, Inc., No. 05-934, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30540, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Nov. 30,
2005)).
128. Id. at *15–16 (quoting AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Comms. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,
650 (1986)). The district court cited several examples of such strong evidence, including
Dickeys Barbecue Restraunts v. Mathieus. Id. (citing Dickeys Barbecue Rests. v. Mathieu,
No. 3:12-cv-5119-G, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133204, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2013)).
129. Id. at *16–17 (citing Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159,
1164 (5th Cir. 1987); Clarus Med., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30540, at *3–4; ESecuritel Hold-
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evidence of the parties’ intent to allow claims for permanent injunctive
relief to be litigated, the district court found that DXP’s claim should be
submitted to arbitration.130
The district court also made much of the fact that the issue that DXP
sought to litigate was the very same issue that Goulds had already
brought before arbitration—that is, whether Goulds could terminate the
agreement based on DXP’s prior alleged breach.131 A finding that DXP
had not breached the agreement and preventing Goulds from terminating
the agreement would effectively deny Goulds the opportunity to have an
arbitrator decide the issues, which would defeat the purpose of a valid
arbitration clause.132
DXP serves as a cautionary case for parties including an arbitration
clause in their franchise agreement: “notwithstanding” language conflicts
with the arbitration provision and does not provide sufficiently clear or
explicit exemptions for permanent injunction claims.133 Although the line
is not so easily drawn, the DXP ruling indicates a preference that exemp-
tions from arbitration be identified and stated using explicit language.
Allee Corp. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. also reflects an inclination to
broadly interpret an arbitration clause to include all possible claims.134
Two car dealerships sued a professional services company for wrongfully
deleting its electronic business records, alleging causes of action for de-
claratory judgment, negligence, and breach of contract.135 The defendant
moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause in the
contract.136
Once again, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
considered whether a plaintiff’s claims could be litigated under a strong
presumption that favors arbitration.137 The arbitration clause covered
“[a]ny disputes . . . related directly or indirectly” to the agreement or an
exhibit specifying items or services—language that indicated a broad ar-
ings v. Youghiogheny, No. 4-12-0302-cv, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10017, at *3–4 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Dec. 5, 2012, pet. denied)).
130. DXP Enters., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156158, at *18, *20.
131. Id. at *8–9.
132. Id. at *19–20 (citing Halide Grp Inc. v. Hyo-sung Corp., No. 10-02392, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 118739, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2010); H2O to Go, LLC v. Martinez, No. 05-
21353, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49317, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2005); Baychar v. Frisby
Techs., No. 01-cv-28-B-S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11037, at *9 (D. Me. July 26, 2001)).
133. See id. at *12–13, *16–18; cf. Dickeys, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133204, at *6–9 (find-
ing that all claims for injunctive relief were excluded from arbitration where the provision
contained the word “notwithstanding” while exempting claims for injunctive relief in court
and without having first been brought to arbitration).
134. See generally Allee Corp. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., No. 3:15-CV-0744-D, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55548 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2015).
135. Id. at *1–2.
136. Id. at *3.
137. Id. at *13–14 (“Thus the party seeking to compel arbitration need only show that
the arbitration clause can plausibly be read to cover the dispute in issue.”) (citing Neal v.
Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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bitration clause.138 Given this low bar, the district court found that the
defendant established that the plaintiffs’ claims related at least indirectly
to the agreement.139 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant breached
the agreement and complained about the defendant’s services performed
under the agreement.140 The plaintiffs also argued that the defendant’s
assertion that the amount in controversy for the case was $1.7 million
indicated that the parties’ dispute related to failures to pay amounts due
under the agreement—an explicit exception to the arbitration clause.141
The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempts to use the amount in
controversy assertion outside of its intended context.142 However, even if
the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence, “[w]hen the scope of an
arbitration clause is reasonably in doubt, it should be construed in favor
of arbitration. . . . This strong presumption in favor of arbitration applies
with even greater force when the parties include a broad arbitration
clause.”143
The DXP and Allee holdings stand as prime examples of the continu-
ing, strong inclination to give effect to an arbitration clause reasonably
interpreted as broad in scope.
F. JURY WAIVER PROVISIONS
In Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie (Yumilicious I), franchisor
Yumilicious sued the franchisee and its individual guarantors for breach
of two franchise agreements after the franchisee failed to make payments
and closed a store without Yumilicious’s prior consent.144 After the de-
fendants counterclaimed that Yumilicious had fraudulently induced them
into entering the franchise agreements, Yumilicious moved to dismiss the
counterclaims and to strike defendants’ jury demand based on a jury
waiver provision in one of the franchise agreements.145 The defendants
argued that the individual defendants were not bound by the waiver be-
cause they were not parties to the franchise agreement, while Yumilicious
responded that language in the guaranty agreement bound the individual
defendants to the waiver provision.146
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas determined
that Yumilicious did not prove that the defendants had “waived their
right to a jury trial.”147 As a protected constitutional right, the right to a
138. Id. at *14–16 (citing In re Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore (1984) Corp., 981 F.2d
752, 755 (5th Cir. 1993)).
139. Id. at *16–17.
140. Id. at *17.
141. Id. at *18.
142. Id. at *18–19.
143. Id. at *19–20 (quoting Sharifi v. AAMCO Transmission Repair Ctrs., 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47311, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2007)).
144. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, No. 3:13-CV-4841-L, 2014 WL 4055475, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Yumilicious I].
145. Id. at *1, *10–11.
146. Id. at *10.
147. Id. at *12.
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jury trial carries a presumption against its waiver.148 A party may over-
come this presumption by presenting sufficient evidence of a contractual
waiver that “was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”149 The
district court then followed the majority of federal courts in concluding
“that the party seeking to enforce the waiver has the burden of establish-
ing it.”150
The district court considered whether the waiver “was made know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently” according to the following factors:
(1) whether there was gross disparity in bargaining power between
the parties; (2) the business or professional experience of the party
opposing the waiver; (3) whether the opposing party had an opportu-
nity to negotiate contract terms; and (4) whether the clause contain-
ing the waiver was inconspicuous.151
The district court found that the waiver provision was conspicuous be-
cause the words were bolded and the letters were capitalized.152 How-
ever, the contractual language that bound the franchisee’s beneficiaries to
the franchise agreement was not bolded or capitalized and, thus, not con-
spicuous.153 Further, the guaranty agreement did not specifically refer to
the jury waiver provision as it did other franchise agreement provi-
sions.154 Because Yumilicious failed to establish the other factors, the dis-
trict court denied the motion to strike the defendants’ jury demand.155
The holding in Yumilicious I indicates that a party seeking to enforce a
contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial against individual guarantors
must submit evidence that specifically ties the individuals to the general
franchise agreement.156 Where a guaranty agreement references some
sections of the franchise agreement but not others, a court may find that
the individual guarantors did not intend to bind themselves to all provi-
sions of the franchise agreement.157 Yumilicious I also signals an inclina-
tion to place the burden on the party seeking to enforce a jury trial
waiver, although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not
yet determined that issue.158
G. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Yumilicious court also considered the statute of limitations for
counterclaims based on violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
148. Id. at *11.
149. Id.
150. Id.





155. Id. at *12.
156. See id. at *11–12.
157. See id. at *11.
158. See id.
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tices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) (Yumilicious II).159 When
Yumilicious sued the franchisees for failing to make payments and
prematually closing a yogurt shop, defendants counterclaimed that
Yumilicious violated the DTPA by providing a materially deficient
franchise disclosure document (FDD).160
In Yumilicious I, Yumilicious moved to dismiss the DTPA counter-
claim, asserting that the claim was barred by the DTPA’s two-year statute
of limitations.161 The district court agreed, finding that the statute of limi-
tations had expired before the defendants had asserted their counter-
claims.162 According to the defendants, Yumilicious had provided an
FDD that was dated two years earlier than the franchise agreement and
incorrectly stated that Yumilicious had provided earnings financial per-
formance representations six weeks before the defendants signed the
franchise agreements.163 The district court dismissed these arguments,
noting that the defendants acknowledged having received the document
in the same month they signed the franchise agreement.164 Because that
event triggered the statute of limitations, which expired by the time the
defendants asserted their counterclaim, the district court held that the
DTPA claim was barred.165
But when the defendants subsequently moved for reconsideration in
Yumilicious II, the district court found that the DTPA claim was not
barred by the statute of limitations for DTPA claims.166 Instead, the stat-
ute of limitations for counterclaims permitted the DTPA claim.167 First,
the district court considered the defendants’ argument that the discovery
rule saved their DTPA claim, because “[t]he discovery rule tolls a statute
of limitations ‘until the plaintiff knew or . . . should have known of the
facts giving rise to [the claim].’”168 The defendants claimed they did not
discover the ongoing fraudulent misrepresentations until shortly before
the stores failed and the suit commenced.169 The district court found that
the defendants did not meet their burden of affirmatively pleading the
discovery rule and, thus, had waived the matter.170 Even if the defendants
had met this requirement, the district court determined that their plead-
ings did not establish that Yumilicious’s alleged misrepresentations con-
tinued for two years until the stores failed because all the alleged
159. See generally id.; Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, No. 3:13-CV-4841-L,
2015 WL 1822877 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Yumilicious II].
160. Yumilicious I, 2014 WL 4055475, at *1, *4.
161. Id. at *3.




166. Yumilicious II, No. 3:13-CV-4841-L, 2015 WL 1822877, at *1–3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22,
2015).
167. Id.
168. See id. at *1–2 (citing Barker v. Eckman, 213 S.W.3d 306, 311–12 (Tex. 2006)).
169. See id.
170. Id. at *2 (citing Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.
1988)).
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misrepresentations occurred before the franchise agreements were
signed.171 The defendants also claimed that they were not aware that
Yumilicious’s requirement that the franchisee purchase the products in
bulk, pallet-sized quantities would lead to their franchise business being
unable to compete with other yogurt shops.172 The defendants, however,
were aware of this requirement from the beginning. While Yumilicious
stated that “it was in the process of negotiating a contract with a national
distributor” to obtain fair market prices, Yumilicious did not assure the
defendants that such negotiations would eliminate the bulk-size purchase
requirement.173 Because the defendants were aware of these circum-
stances before entering the franchise agreements, the district court found
that the “[d]efendants knew or reasonably should have known the facts
giving rise to their DTPA claim,” such that the discovery rule did not toll
the statute of limitations.174
On the other hand, the district court then accepted the defendants’ ar-
gument that their DTPA claim was not barred under § 16.069 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Act regarding the statute of limita-
tions for counterclaims.175 Although the two-year statute of limitations
for DTPA claims had expired, the statute of limitations for counterclaims
had not.176
Yumilicious II suggests that certain facts or events that occur before a
franchisee enters a franchise agreement may not be sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations under the discovery rule if the franchisee was aware
of their existence before entering the franchise agreement. Further, while
DTPA claims are typically subject to a two-year statute of limitations,
counterclaims are subject to the general statute of limitations for
counterclaims.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—TRADEMARKS
In New York Pizzeria, Inc. v. Syal, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas considered whether a pizzeria franchisor could
pursue claims against a former franchisee, and individual defendants, for
infringement of a distinctive flavor mark and plating trade dress.177
New York Pizzeria, Inc. (NYPI), a franchisor of pizza restaurants, filed
suit alleging that a former vice president of NYPI and owner of an NYPI-
franchised restaurant conspired with others “to create a knockoff restau-
rant chain called Gina’s Italian Kitchen using NYPI’s [trade secrets and





175. Id. at *3.
176. Id. The district court eventually dismissed the defendants’ DTPA claims on other
grounds. See infra Section V.A. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices—Consumer Protection
Act.
177. N.Y.C. Pizzeria, Inc. v. Syal, 56 F. Supp. 3d 875, 877 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
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ments and manuals.”178 NYPI argued that the defendants “infringed on
its trademarks and trade dress,” and brought “two distinct claims under
the Lanham Act.”179 One claim related to the “‘distinctive flavor’ of
NYPI’s [food]”; the other related “to the distinctive presentation, or
‘plating,’ of [NYPI’s] dishes.”180
First, NYPI argued that its “specially sourced branded ingredients and
innovative preparation and preservation techniques contribute[d] to the
distinctive flavor” of its products.181 And by using those ingredients and
processes, defendants had “infringed and/or diluted NYPI’s protected
trademark interest in the distinctive trademark flavor of its products” and
were therefore liable under the Lanham Act.182
The district court noted that while there was “no special legal rule” in
the Lanham Act that prevented a flavor from serving as a trademark, “it
is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as
color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign—that permits it to serve [trade-
mark] purposes.”183 The district court found that it is possible for flavor
to “‘carry meaning’ . . . only if it distinguishes the source of a product”;
however, it is only when a flavor has acquired distinctiveness, or “secon-
dary meaning,” that the flavor has any chance to serve as a valid trade-
mark.184The district court also found that it was unlikely that flavors—
like colors—could “ever be inherently distinctive because they do not au-
tomatically suggest a product’s source.”185 Thus, the district court held
that in order to be protectable as a trademark, a flavor must have ac-
quired secondary meaning such that customers associate the flavor with
its source.186
In addition, the district court addressed the functionality doctrine: “A
product feature is functional if ‘it is essential to the use or purpose of the
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article, that is, if exclusive
use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
178. Id. at 877.
179. Id. at 880 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting First Amend. Compl. at ¶ 76, N.Y.C. Pizzeria, Inc. v. Sval, 56 F. Supp.
3d 875 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 3:13-cv-00335), 2013 WL 11109493).
182. Id. (quoting First Amend. Compl. at ¶ 77, N.Y.C. Pizzeria, Inc. v. Sval, 56 F. Supp.
3d 875 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 3:13-cv-00335), 2013 WL 11109493).
183. Id. at 880–81.
184. Id. at 881.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 252 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he essence of a protected mark is its capacity to distinguish a product and identify its
source.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (“[A] mark
has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently distinctive, if it has developed sec-
ondary meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance
of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’”); In re
N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639, at *15 (T.T.A.B. June 14, 2006) (“Because flavor is
generally seen as a characteristic of the goods, rather than as a trademark, a flavor, just as
in the cases of color and scent, can never be inherently distinctive.”)).
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related disadvantage.’”187 In the case of food, the district court observed
that the functionality hurdle may be insurmountable because the “flavor
of food undoubtedly affects its quality, and is therefore . . . a functional
element of the product.”188
NYPI was “unable to cite any case recognizing a trademark in the fla-
vor of food.”189 Indeed, NYPI did “not allege that its supposedly unique
flavoring was merely an identifier, and any such allegation would be im-
plausible given that the flavor of pasta and pizza has a functional pur-
pose.”190 Therefore, the district court dismissed NYPI’s trademark
claim.191
Next, the district court considered NYPI’s plating infringement claim
and found that “[w]hile the flavor infringement claim [was] plainly half-
baked, NYPI’s plating infringement claim deserve[d] closer considera-
tion” because, unlike the flavor infringement claim, plating does not al-
ways serve a functional purpose.192 NYPI alleged a protected trade dress
interest in “the distinctive visual presentation of the product to customers
. . . [which] includes, but is not limited to, the presentation of baked ziti,
eggplant parmesan, and chicken parmesan.”193
The district court recognized that there might be some rare circum-
stances in which the plating of food could be given trade dress protection,
for example, for a well-known “signature dish.”194 But, in the trade dress
context, a plaintiff must articulate the elements that comprise its pro-
tected trade dress so that the district court can evaluate the plausibility of
its claim and the defendant has fair notice of the grounds of the claim.195
Here, the district court held that NYPI did not identify its trade dress
with sufficient particularity because NYPI did not explain why its dishes’
presentations were distinctive and nonfunctional, or how they were in-
fringed.196 Therefore, the district court dismissed NYPI’s trade dress
claim.197
Though this may seem like a tough ruling for franchisors of distinctive
food flavors, it is an appropriate outcome. Otherwise, the first food dis-
tributor to trademark a flavor profile could prevent all others from repli-
cating that flavor and could greatly restrict innovation in our food supply.
The ruling also makes sense because food vendors can still rely on
187. Id. (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).







195. Id. at 883 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. v. Converse Inc., 175
F. App’x 672, 677–81 (5th Cir. 2006)).
196. Id.
197. Id.
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trade secret law to protect their recipes.198 However, this case serves as a
good reminder to those in the restaurant industry to protect their trade
secrets. For example, franchisors should take precautions to guard their
cooking secrets and to ensure that they are employing effective nondis-
closures and confidentiality agreements with their franchisees.199
IV. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES—THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
Texas courts impose extra-contractual duties of “good faith and fair
dealing” only when a special relationship between the parties exists.200
These duties generally result from the unequal bargaining positions be-
tween parties to a contract.201 Texas courts have found no special rela-
tionship between or among the parties to an extensive laundry list of
contractually-based transactions.202 In particular, Texas courts have
found no special relationship exists between parties to a franchise agree-
ment.203 In Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Co. v. Apparel Ltd, Inc.,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered
whether Texas would recognize a special relationship between a licensor
and licensee.204 Not surprisingly, the district court determined that no
special relationship existed.205
Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Co. (Williamson-Dickie) and Ap-
parel Ltd. (Apparel) entered into a licensing agreement granting Apparel
the exclusive right to sell Williamson-Dickie branded products using Wil-
liamson-Dickie’s trademarks through “authorized channels,” including
mass-merchandisers, in the United States.206 After Williamson-Dickie
sued Apparel, Apparel counterclaimed for breach of good faith and fair
dealing based on the allegation that Williamson-Dickie had sold products
directly to mass merchandisers.207 Observing that no Texas court has ad-
dressed the issue of whether a licensor owes a licensee a duty of good
faith and fair dealing, the court made an “Erie guess” as to how the Texas
Supreme Court would rule.208
198. Mark S. VanderBroek & Christian B. Turner, Protecting and Enforcing Trade
Secrets, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 191, 192 (2006).
199. Id.
200. See Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Apparel Ltd., No. 4:15-CV-164-A, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75227, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2015) (citing City of Maryland v. O’Bryant,
18 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. 2000); Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84
S.W.3d 212, 225 (Tex. 2002)).
201. See id. at *6
202. See id.
203. See id. (citing Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212,
225 (Tex. 2002)).
204. Id. at *5.
205. Id. at *7.
206. Id. at *2.
207. Id. at *3.
208. Id. at *6.
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Applying Texas law, the district court recognized that Texas law does
not recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair duty in con-
tracts, absent a special relationship, such as insurance contracts.209 Com-
paring the licensor-licensee relationship to the franchisor-franchisee
relationship, where Texas courts have already declined to find a special
relationship, the court determined that the implied covenant did not exist
in a trademark license agreement because the licensor-licensee relation-
ship closely resembled the franchisor-franchisee relationship.210 Thus, the
court added the trademark license agreement to the list of contractually-
based transactions in which no special relationship between the parties
exists.211
B. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
In a third Yumilicious decision (Yumilicious III)—a separate opinion
from the other two Yumilicious cases mentioned above—the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas considered Yumilicious’s motion
for partial dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaims and motion for par-
tial summary judgment.212 After Yumilicious brought an action against
franchisee defendants for breaches of the two franchise agreements, fran-
chisees counterclaimed that Yumilicious fraudulently induced them into
entering into the franchise agreements and asserted claims for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation, among other claims.213 The franchisee’s
claims were based on Yumilicious’s alleged failure to perform on-site
evaluations and inspections, operational advice, and product sourcing
pursuant to the terms of the franchise agreements, as well as alleged mis-
statements made regarding product pricing.214
First, the district court dealt with the fraud claims. In granting
Yumilicious’s motion to dismiss the fraud and negligent misrepresenta-
tion claims, the district court determined that these claims were barred by
the economic loss rule, which prevents recovery in tort for a party’s fail-
ure to perform under a contract.215 The district court determined that the
economic loss rule applied because the fraud and negligent misrepresen-
tation claims were tied directly to the franchise agreements and arose
only from the contractual relationship between the parties.216 Nor did the
franchisee show “any loss independent of the franchise agreement.”217
Next, the district court turned to the alleged misrepresentations regard-
ing price allegedly made by the franchisor’s sales representative.218 The
209. Id. at *5–6.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, No. 3:13-CV-4841-L, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 53144, at *10–14 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Yumilicious III].
213. Id. at *2–3.
214. Id. at *15, *21–22.
215. Id. at *19–20.
216. Id. at *20.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *21–22.
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district court dismissed these claims as well because the franchisee failed
to provide any evidence that any representations were made, whether
through depositions, testimony, or other evidence.219
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The issue of joint employment, which results essentially in imposing
vicarious liability on the franchisor for labor law violations asserted by a
franchisee’s employees against the franchisee, has been front and center
in franchising since the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued
complaints against McDonald’s USA, LLC (McDonald’s) and franchisees
of McDonald’s, as joint employers of the franchisee’s employees.220 The
complaints are based upon the NLRB’s new standard that by possessing
the ability to exercise control over a franchisee’s employment policies,
the franchisor becomes a joint employer of the franchisee’s employees
even if the franchisor does not actually exercise any control.221
In response to the NLRB’s wide-reaching determination that would
classify franchisors as joint employers with its franchisees, the 84th Regu-
lar Legislative Session passed SB 652, which became effective on Septem-
ber 1, 2015.222 SB 652 generally protects franchisors from blanket
exposure to liability for employment claims asserted by franchisees and
the employees of franchisees. The bill amends Texas Labor Law to estab-
lish that unless a franchisor exercises direct control over a franchisee or a
franchisee’s employees above and beyond what is necessary to protect
the franchisor’s trademarks brand, the franchisor will not be deemed an
employer of a franchisee or a joint employer of the franchisee’s employ-
ees.223 SB 652 sets forth a joint employment standard previously utilized
by the NLRB prior to the complaints issued against McDonald’s.224 The
standard applies in the context of employment discrimination, wage and
hour payment, minimum wage law, professional employer organization
law, unemployment law, workers compensation law, and workplace
safety law.225 Future court decisions should clarify what conduct consti-
tutes “necessary” control versus control that is “above and beyond.”
Franchisors often face the issue of whether the franchisor is a proper
party to an employment proceeding brought before an administrative
219. Id. at *22.
220. See NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated Complaints Against
McDonald’s Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald’s USA, LLC as Joint Employers,
NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD. (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-
story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-issues-consolidated-complaints-against [https://perma.cc/
A87X-NFS6].
221. See Board Issues Decision in Browning-Ferris Industries, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS
BD. (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-issues-decision-
browning-ferris-industries [https://perma.cc/GY8S-NWQH].





182 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
agency by a franchisee’s employee. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered this issue in EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd.,226 which
potentially expanded the number of discrimination and harassment suits
franchisors may face for discrimination and harassment committed by
franchisees.
Here, two female employees of a Berryhill Baja Grill & Cantina
franchise filed separate charges of sexual harassment with the Equal Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC), naming “Berryhill Baja Grill” and listing
the franchisee’s address.227 Even though the franchisor, Berryhill Hot Ta-
males Corporation, was not named as a party, the EEOC served notice
on the franchisor that charges had been filed against “your organiza-
tion.”228 The franchisor was not “invited to the fact-finding conference,
and the majority of the notices relating to EEOC proceedings appear to
have gone solely to” the franchisee.229
After investigating, the EEOC determined that the franchisee “had en-
gaged in sexual harassment in violation of Title VII” and filed suit against
the franchisee in the Southern District of Texas.230 The employees then
intervened and added the franchisor as a defendant, alleging that the
franchisor was their single or joint employer under Title VII.231 The
franchisor moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) the employ-
ees “failed to exhaust their administrative remedies” because the
franchisor was not named as a party in their EEOC charges; and (2) the
employees could not show that the franchisor was either a single or joint
employer under Title VII.232 The district court granted summary judg-
ment on the first ground, determining that the employees “could not in-
voke the judicially-recognized exceptions to Title VII’s named-party
requirement because they were represented by counsel when they filed
their charges” with the EEOC.233
On appeal, the employees argued: (1) by identifying “Berryhill Baja
Grill,” the trade name of the franchisor in their EEOC complaint, they
had, in fact, named the franchisor; and (2) even if the franchisor had not
been named in the EEOC charges, represented parties are entitled to
invoke the judicially-recognized exceptions to Title VII’s named-party re-
quirement.234 The Fifth Circuit rejected the first argument but agreed
with the second—represented parties, and not just pro se litigants, can
invoke the exception to the rule that only named parties can be subse-
quently sued in federal court.235 The Fifth Circuit found no justification
226. 767 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2014). Haynes and Boone represented the franchisor Berry-
hill in this matter.
227. Id. at 479.
228. Id.
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for limiting the exceptions to pro se litigants.236 First, the Fifth Circuit
determined that allowing represented parties to invoke the exceptions is
more consistent with the principle that pro se litigants are required to
follow the federal rules of procedure and are held to the same pleading
requirements as represented parties.237 Second, the holding, which allows
all litigants to invoke the exceptions, is more consistent with the liberal
construction of Title VII’s requirements.238 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
remanded the case back to the district court for a determination as to
whether franchisor was a proper defendant.239
For franchisors, the named-party issue arises at the EEOC level with
some frequency. Simbaki may therefore increase the legal risks faced by
corporate parents. Thus, franchisors should pay close attention to Title
VII allegations even if they are not directly identified in the EEOC
charge. If the franchisor receives sufficient notice of the allegations, the
named-party requirement may not be a defense to liability.
In Domino’s Pizza, L.L.C. v. Reddy, the Beaumont Court of Appeals
overturned a jury verdict that found Domino’s franchisor vicariously lia-
ble for a death and serious injuries resulting from an accident caused by
the defective vehicle of a delivery driver.240 The court of appeals declared
that whether a franchisor may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its
franchisees depends on whether the franchisor had the right to the con-
trol the injury-causing conduct.241 The court of appeals held that the “evi-
dence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Domino’s
controlled or had the right to control the details of the [franchisees and its
employees’] injury-producing acts or omissions.”242 And because of the
legally insufficient evidence, the court of appeals determined that it could
not hold franchisor Domino’s vicariously liable.243 Accordingly, the court
of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and dismissed the negli-
gence claims against Domino’s.244
A vehicle driven by the franchisee’s employee hydroplaned due to a
bald tire and wet pavement, and struck a vehicle, killing one of the plain-
tiffs and injuring another.245 The guardian of the estate and persons of
plaintiffs sued Domino’s and the franchisee for negligence.246 After the
franchisee settled, the case proceeded to trial against Domino’s.247 The
jury apportioned liability and determined that the employee was 10%
236. Id. at 484–85.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 485.
239. Id.
240. Domino’s Pizza, L.L.C. v. Reddy, No. 09-14-00058-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS
2578, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 19, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
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negligent, the franchisee was 30% negligent, and Domino’s was 60% neg-
ligent.248 After apportioning negligence, the jury then found that Dom-
ino’s was vicariously liable because of four reasons: (1) Domino’s
“controlled or had the right to control . . . the injury-producing acts or
omissions” of the franchisee and the franchisee’s employees; (2) “Dom-
ino’s failed to exercise ordinary care in the control or right to control
those details”; (3) Domino’s failure to use this “ordinary care was the
proximate cause of the occurrence in question”; and (4) the franchisee’s
employee was “operating his vehicle in furtherance of a mission for the
benefit of Domino’s and subject to Domino’s control.”249 Domino’s ap-
pealed, contending that “the evidence [was] legally insufficient to estab-
lish that [Domino’s] owed a duty to the [plaintiffs] because . . . it had no
right to control the [franchisee’s] day-to-day operations, did not exercise
control over the injury-producing acts,” and that, therefore, a court could
not hold Domino’s vicariously liable for the acts of the franchisee or the
franchisee’s employees.250
To determine whether a franchisor is vicariously liable for a fran-
chisee’s conduct, the court of appeals considered “whether the franchisor
has the right to control the franchisee with respect to the details” of the
specific injury-causing conduct at issue.251 Right to control can be estab-
lished by evidence of either a contractual agreement that explicitly as-
signs the franchisor a right to control or the franchisor’s actual control.252
Pointing to the following evidence as support, Plaintiffs contended that
Domino’s had both a contractual right of control and actual control:
(1) [the franchisee] must comply with Domino’s specifications, stan-
dards, and operating procedures, including the “methods and proce-
dures relating to receiving, preparing, and delivering customer
orders[;]” (2) Domino’s can unilaterally modify its standards and
procedures and can conduct inspections; (3) Domino’s [could] termi-
nate the franchise agreement if [the franchisee] fails to comply with
corporate standards and procedures; (4) Domino’s standards regu-
late driver age and history, safety, vehicle inspections, and driver
conduct during deliveries; (5) [Domino’s standards] promote speed-
ing among delivery drivers by use of the thirty-minute rule, . . . time
tracking, evaluations that factored delivery times into their scores
and affected bonuses, and encouragement of incentives to improve
job performance; and (6) Domino’s decided the store’s delivery area
and provided directions and maps though [software that its franchis-
ees were required to use].253
The court of appeals first considered whether Domino’s had actual
control over the franchisee and determined that no “right to control” ex-
248. Id.
249. Id. at *1–2.
250. Id. at *2.
251. Id. at *3.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *12–13.
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isted.254 In making this determination, the court of appeals looked to the
franchise agreement, which expressly provided that:
(1) [the franchisee] is an independent contractor; (2) the store’s staff
are employed by [the franchisee, not Domino’s]; (3) Domino’s has
no legal right to direct [the franchisee’s] employees; (4) [the fran-
chisee] is solely responsible for recruiting, hiring, training, schedul-
ing, supervising, and paying its employees; (5) [the franchisee] is
solely responsible for operating the store; and (6) Domino’s does not
assume [the franchisee’s] responsibilities by providing “reasonable
operating assistance.”255
That Domino’s could terminate the franchise agreement, had a right to
receive evaluations and other reports, could conduct inspections, or re-
quired franchisee to comply with Domino’s procedures and rules was
“not evidence that Domino’s had the right to control.”256
The court of appeals next rejected plaintiff’s argument that Domino’s
had a contractual right to control.257 Under the franchise agreement, the
relationship between franchisee and franchisor was that of independent
contractor.258 The express provisions of a contract indicating that the par-
ties’ relationship is an independent contractor may be determinative ab-
sent the following evidence: (1) “the contract is a mere sham”; (2) the
contract is a “subterfuge designed to conceal the true legal status of the
parties”; or (3) “the contract has been modified by a subsequent agree-
ment between the parties.”259 Here, the court of appeals found no evi-
dence to negate the franchise agreement’s express provision that sets an
independent contractor relationship between the parties.260 The court of
appeals characterized the franchise agreement as “merely set[ting] forth
the standards related to work,” while leaving the “responsibility of imple-
menting the details of those standards” to the franchisee’s discretion.261
An “occasional assertion of control or sporadic action directing the de-
tails of work” would not be enough to negate the express provision in the
franchise agreement that sets the parties’ independent contractor
relationship.262
Finally, the court of appeals rejected franchisee’s argument that “Dom-
ino’s may be liable for unreasonably increasing the risk of harm.”263 The
court of appeals worked with the premise that a contract, such as the
franchise agreement, which “requir[es] independent contractors to com-
ply with general safety practices and train their employees to do so can-
254. Id. at *14–15.
255. Id. at *13–14.
256. Id. at *14.
257. Id. at *15–16.
258. Id. at *4.
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260. Id. at *15–16.
261. Id. at *15.
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not constitute a right to control.”264 Nor could the franchisee’s allegations
that Domino’s failed to implement or enforce a safety rule amount to
actual control.265 Here, the “means, methods, and details of implement-
ing Domino’s standards” were left to the franchisee’s discretions, and the
franchisee was responsible for training its employees, including drivers.266
Therefore, Domino’s imposition of contractual safety requirements,
alone, did not subject Domino’s to a duty of care to prevent its indepen-
dent-contractor franchisee’s negligent conduct or to vicarious liability for
its independent contractor’s negligence.267
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that “the evidence [was] le-
gally insufficient to support the jury’s findings that Domino’s controlled
or had the right to control the details of the injury-producing acts or
omissions of [the franchisee] and [the franchisee’s] employees.”268
Domino’s is an example of how most courts are recognizing that the
franchising model presents a unique situation for vicarious liability analy-
sis. Although the Plaintiffs brought direct negligence claims against Dom-
ino’s, the court’s analysis focused on whether the franchisor owed a duty
to Plaintiffs by following traditional vicarious liability analysis in the
franchise context.269 The court focused on which party actually had con-
trol over the instrumentality that caused the accident—in this case, driver
training and means, method, and details of delivery safety.270 The court
also emphasized that the franchise agreement designated that the fran-
chisee was an independent contractor.271
D. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
BP Automotive, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, LLC272 involved a
failed asset purchase agreement for the sale of assets of a car dealership
located in Waxahachie, Texas. In 2008, the car dealership, BP Automo-
tive, L.P. (Bossier Dodge), “experienced financial difficulties and began
looking for a potential buyer for its assets.”273 In 2009, a group of RML
entities (RML) executed an asset purchase agreement, under which Boss-
ier Dodge would sell its dealership assets.274 As a condition of the deal,
RML needed to seek the approval of Chrysler Motor, L.L.C.
(Chrysler).275 Thereafter, Chrysler filed for bankruptcy and rejected
Bossier Dodge’s franchise agreement as part of the bankruptcy proceed-
264. Id.
265. Id. at *16–17.
266. Id. at *17.
267. Id. at *17–18.
268. Id. at *18.
269. See id. at *12–18.
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ings.276 Subsequently, “the reorganized Chrysler awarded RML [a
franchise agreement] in Waxahachie.”277
Bossier Dodge then sued the potential buyer, RML, for breach of con-
tract, tortious interference with an existing contract, tortious interference
with a prospective business relationship, and several other causes of ac-
tion.278 RML moved for a no-evidence summary judgment on the tor-
tious interference claims, which the trial court granted.279 The First
Houston Court of Appeals determined that the lower court properly
granted the no-evidence motion as to the tortious interference with an
existing contract claim, but erred in granting RML’s motion as to the tor-
tious interference with prospective business relationship claim.280
In Texas, there are four the elements to a cause of action for tortious
interference with an existing contract: “(1) an existing contract subject to
interference, (2) a willful and intentional act of interference with the con-
tract, (3) that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) caused
actual damage or loss.”281 “Bossier Dodge argue[d] that ‘[RML] [had]
induced Chrysler to breach its franchise agreement with Bossier Dodge
after Chrysler’s bankruptcy so that RML would be awarded’” the Wax-
ahachie franchise.282 As to this claim, the court of appeals determined
that “Bossier Dodge presented no evidence that Chrysler was bound to
continue the franchise agreements that existed prior to its bank-
ruptcy.”283 Indeed, the record showed that acceptance or rejection of the
previously existing franchises was a requirement of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.284 Thus, the court of appeals found that there was “no evidence
of an existing contract that was subject to interference.”285 In addition,
there was also no evidence of any willful or intentional act since the act
complained of was “RML’s filing of an application for the Chrysler
franchise, presumably in competition with Bossier Dodge’s own applica-
tion.”286 Such competition was not a prohibited act.287 Because there was
no evidence of an existing contract subject to interference or of a willful
and intentional act of interference by RML, “the trial court properly
granted the no-evidence motion for summary judgment” on Bossier
Dodge’s tortious interference with an existing contract claim.288
By contrast, the court of appeals determined that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment on Bossier Dodge’s claim for tortious in-
276. Id.
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280. Id. at 570–71.
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terference with prospective business relations.289 In Texas, there are four
elements to a tortious interference with prospective business relationship
claim:
(1) a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered
into a business relationship; (2) an independently tortious or unlaw-
ful act by the defendant that prevented the relationship from occur-
ring; (3) the defendant did such act with a conscious desire to
prevent the relationship from occurring or the defendant knew the
interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result
of the conduct; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm or damages
as a result of the defendant’s interference.290
RML asserted that Bossier Dodge failed to establish any of these four
elements.291 The court of appeals found that the affidavit testimony
presented by Bossier Dodge contained more than a scintilla of evidence
in support of its claim for tortious interference with prospective business
relations.292 In this affidavit, one of Bossier Dodge’s limited partners tes-
tified that a potential buyer of Bossier Dodge’s assets approached the
limited partner about buying Bossier Dodge’s assets. The limited partner
testified that when the potential buyer attempted to view the assets, RML
incorrectly told the potential buyer that the assets had already been sold
to RML.293 Because Bossier Dodge had presented more than a scintilla
of evidence in support of its claim for tortious interference with prospec-
tive business relationship, the court of appeals concluded that the trial
court erred in granting RML’s no-evidence motion for summary judg-
ment on this claim.294
In Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Co. v. Apparel Ltd., previously
discussed, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas de-
termined that a duty of good faith and fair dealing did not exist in a licen-
sor-licensee relationship.295 The district court also dismissed the
licensee’s claims that a licensor tortiously interfered with its prospective
business relationships but upheld the licensee’s claims that the licensor
tortiously interfered with the licensee’s existing business relationships.296
As discussed above, the license agreement at issue gave Apparel the ex-
clusive right to sell Williamson-Dickie branded products using William-
son-Dickie’s trademarks through “authorized channels,” including mass
merchandisers such as Wal-Mart, in the United States.297 Apparel as-
serted tortious interference counterclaims based on the theory that Wil-







295. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Apparel Ltd., No. 4:15-CV-164-A, 2015 U.S. Dist.
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sales tortiously interfered with its existing business relationships with its
buyer as well as with its prospective customers.298
First, the district court determined that Apparel had adequately pled a
cause of action for tortious interference with its existing business relation-
ships.299 Williamson-Dickie challenged the claim on the ground that Ap-
parel failed to plead that Williamson-Dickie’s conduct was unlawful.300
The district court, however, found that Apparel had properly pleaded a
claim for tortious interference with existing contact because the conduct
need not be unlawful.301 Because Apparel pleaded that there was an ex-
isting contract and that Williamson-Dickie intentionally and willfully in-
terfered with it, which proximately caused injury, Apparel had properly
pleaded a claim for tortious interference with an existing contract.302
On the other hand, the district court dismissed Apparel’s claim for tor-
tious interference with prospective business relationship, which requires
that the interference was independently tortious or unlawful, as discussed
above.303 Apparel relied on its allegations that Williamson-Dickie’s con-
duct was unlawful because it was in breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.304 However, because there is no implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing in a licensor-licensee relationship, the dis-
trict court concluded that Apparel had failed to establish a tortious inter-
ference with prospective business relationship claim.305
V. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES—CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT
In Yumilicious II, discussed above for its statute of limitations issues,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas determined that
allegations of a technical violation of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Franchise Act (Franchise Rule), without more, cannot support a DTPA
claim based on the theory of representations or omissions.306 In this case,
the franchisor filed suit against the franchisee, alleging that the franchisee
breached two franchise agreements.307 The franchisee then asserted
counterclaims for, inter alia, DTPA violations, alleging that the franchisor
had violated the Franchise Rule by providing a materially deficient
franchise disclosure agreement with an earlier date.308 The franchisor
298. Id. at *7–8.
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moved to dismiss the DTPA claim, which the district court initially
granted on statute of limitations grounds.309 When the franchisee moved
for reconsideration of the order, the district court, instead, examined the
sufficiency of the franchisee’s DTPA allegations under §§ 17.46(b)(5) and
17.46(b)(24) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.310
The franchisee alleged that the franchisor had made assurances that the
franchise could expand nationally and that the franchisor was negotiating
a contract for such expansion with a national distributor (but the
franchisor ultimately did not consummate the deal).311 The district court
denied the franchisee’s motion for reconsideration, finding that the fran-
chisee had failed to allege that the franchisor knowingly made false state-
ments or that the franchisee had detrimentally relied on those
statements.312 As it stood, the franchisee could only establish that the
franchisor had committed a technical violation of the Franchise Rule
when it failed to include all of the financial performance information pre-
viously given to the franchisee—allegations that were not sufficient to
state a DTPA claim.313 The holding in Yumilicious II serves as a reminder
that “mere nondisclosure of material information is not enough to estab-
lish an actionable DTPA claim,” and technical violations of the Franchise
Rule, without evidence of intent or detrimental reliance, cannot support a
DTPA claim.314
B. BANKRUPTCY ISSUES
In Pizza Patron Inc. v. Saenz (In re Saenz), the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas considered indemnification and subroga-
tion fraud claims under the statutory provisions related to non-discharge-
able debt.315 Here, Saenz, the franchisee who claimed to be a franchise
representative, sold a Pizza Patron franchise to Gomez without Pizza Pa-
tron’s permission.316 Gomez eventually sued Saenz and Pizza Patron, al-
leging that Saenz acted as Pizza Patron’s agent while committing fraud
and other torts.317 In response, Pizza Patron filed a Complaint for Deter-
mination of Non-dischargeable Debt under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2) and
523(a)(4), seeking indemnification and subrogation from Saenz if it was
found liable for Saenz’s fraud.318
Pizza Patron pled direct fraud against Saenz, but the district court
found that Pizza Patron had failed to allege sufficient facts to support the
309. Id. at *3–4.
310. Yumilicious II, 2015 WL 1822877, at *3–6; see also supra, Section II.G. Statute of
Limitations.
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314. Id. at *4, *6 (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Hometown Real Estate Co.,
890 S.W.2d 118, 126 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied) (alteration in original).
315. Pizza Patron Inc. v. Saenz (In re Saenz), 515 B.R. 521, 523 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
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317. Id. at 526.
318. Id. at 524, 526.
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claim.319 In addition, Pizza Patron alleged claims for derivative fraud
based on Gomez’s fraud claims against Saenz.320 Saenz countered that
Pizza Patron failed to state a claim because the movant creditor must
have been the target of the alleged fraud.321 The district court disagreed,
finding that such an interpretation of the law would violate the underly-
ing purpose of the Bankruptcy Code to prevent debtors from discharging
any debts arising from their own fraud.322 Instead, the district court ruled
that Pizza Patron could assert a claim based on fraud committed against
another person.323 However, because Pizza Patron’s derivative fraud
claims were based on Gomez’s fraud claims, the district court would al-
low Pizza Patron to amend its claim under § 523(a)(2) only if Gomez suc-
cessfully pled his claim under the same section.324 Because Gomez had
already successfully stated a claim under § 523(a)(4), the district court
upheld Pizza Patron’s indemnification and subrogation claim under this
section.325
Although Pizza Patron was ultimately dismissed from the suit,326 Pizza
Patron shows that claims for indemnification or subrogation may qualify
as a non-dischargeable debt even when the debt is based on a liability
resulting from a third party’s fraud claim. In such cases, the statute does
not require that the fraud be committed against the movant.327 While this
issue seems to have been scarcely considered in this district before this
case, the court’s holding falls in line with bankruptcy law’s policy of pro-
tecting the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”328
Next, In re Simbaki, Ltd. explored the statutory deadline for a creditor
to file Chapter 11 plans of reorganization and the consequences of a
court’s failure to confirm such a plan within the statutory deadline.329
Simbaki involved a small business debtor who filed a voluntary petition
for Chapter 11 relief and entered a plan of reorganization.330 When nu-
merous parties filed objections, Simbaki withdrew the proposed plan.331
Later, Simbaki’s primary secured creditor asked for a continuance to pro-
pose an alternate plan.332 Several parties opposed the continuance and
moved to dismiss the case, arguing that because the statutory deadline for
filing and confirming any plan of reorganization had passed, cause existed
319. Id. at 526.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 527–28 (quoting Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998)).
323. Id. at 528.
324. Id. at 528, 532; see also id. at 532 (noting that the district court had previously
granted Gomez leave to amend his claim under § 523(a)(2)).
325. Id. at 529.
326. Gomez v. Saenz, 534 B.R. 276, 281 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
327. See Pizza Patron, 515 B.R. at 526.
328. See id. at 526–28 (quoting Cohen, 523 U.S. at 217).
329. See generally In re Simbaki, Ltd., 522 B.R. 917 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014).
330. Id. at 918–19.
331. Id. at 919.
332. Id.
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under § 1112 to dismiss or convert the case.333
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas rejected
this contention, holding that the 300-day deadline for filing a plan applied
only to plans proposed by a debtor, not plans proposed by a creditor.334
The bankruptcy court found that a review of the statute’s legislative his-
tory and Congress’ intent in amending the statute suggested that the stat-
utory deadline was intended to apply only to plans offered by a debtor.335
Further, the bankruptcy court found that cause to dismiss the case did
not exist based on the court’s failure to confirm a plan within the 45-day
statutory deadline.336 Although the bankruptcy court acknowledged a na-
tionwide split on the issue, the bankruptcy court rejected the contention
that the plain language of the statute mandated dismissal or conversion if
a plan was not confirmed before the deadline passed.337 The bankruptcy
court reasoned that while “[d]ismissing or converting the debtor’s case in
a situation where it failed to comply with a deadline is appropriate[,
i]mposing a penalty on a debtor when a court did not approve their plan
is a different proposition.”338
The holding in Simbaki signals a reluctance to dismiss Chapter 11 cases
where creditors participate in the reorganization process, even if debtors
have missed a statutory deadline to file a reorganization plan and the
court has missed its deadline to confirm. Other jurisdictions, however,
mandate a dismissal after the confirmation deadline has passed, and the
300-day deadline for filing a plan is an ambiguous statute that is subject to
different interpretations.339 Thus, it is important for debtor and creditor
parties alike to recognize the applicable law during the reorganization
process.
VI. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Yumicilious III, discussed earlier for its fraud and misrepresentation
claims, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held
that the defendants could not recover consequential and punitive dam-
ages because they had waived their right to recover those damages by
signing guaranty agreements supporting franchise agreements that con-
tained such a waiver.340 Relying on a damages waiver provision in the
franchise agreements signed by the defendant-franchisee, which the indi-
vidual defendants personally guaranteed, Yumilicious argued an affirma-
tive defense of waiver against defendants’ request for consequential and
333. Id.
334. Id. at 920–21.
335. Id. at 921–22.
336. Id. at 923–24.
337. Id. at 924.
338. Id.
339. See id. at 921, 923.
340. Yumilicious III, No. 3:13-CV-4841-L, 2015 WL 1856729, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23,
2015).
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punitive damages.341 Defendants maintained that the waiver provision
did not apply to the individual defendants, because the provision was not
conspicuous and the individual defendants were not parties to the
franchise agreements.342
The district court determined that the damages waiver provision ap-
plied to both the defendant-franchisee and the individual defendants,
even those defendants who had not signed both agreements.343 The dis-
trict court considered the conspicuousness of the waiver provision based
on whether “a reasonable person against whom a clause is to operate
ought to have noticed it.”344 The waiver provision contained a heading
that appeared in all capitals, bold, and underlined typeface as well as text
that appeared in all capitals and bold typeface.345 The provision also
stated in all capitals and boldface letters that the provision applied to the
franchisee and the franchisee’s principals.346 Further, the guaranty agree-
ments, signed by the individual defendants, referenced the specific sub-
section containing the waiver provision on the same page as language
stating that the guarantors personally agreed to obligate themselves to
the franchisee’s agreements.347 The district court also noted that one of
the franchisee’s principals and guarantors signed both the franchise and
guaranty agreements.348 Based on the language of the franchise and guar-
anty agreements, the court held that the damages waiver provision was
conspicuous as a matter of law and that all the individual defendants,
along with the franchisee, were bound to that provision through the terms
of the guaranty agreements.349
Based on this holding, personal guarantors of a franchisee should take
care in reviewing and signing franchise and guaranty agreements, espe-
cially with regards to waiver provisions. In particular, individual non-sig-
natories of a franchise agreement may find themselves subject to all of
the agreement’s provisions even where only one principal-guarantor was
a party and signatory to both the franchise and guaranty agreements.
B. COMPENSATORY & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Goldmark Hospitality, LLC, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Choice Ho-
tels’s summary judgment motions for monetary and injunctive relief de-
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was not directly involved in the franchise agreement.350 Franchisor
Choice Hotels entered into a franchise agreement with a franchisee that
later defaulted and filed for bankruptcy.351 Around the time that Choice
Hotels terminated the franchise agreement, defendant Goldmark became
owner of the franchisee’s hotel property as the beneficiary of a deed of
trust.352 Goldmark then began to operate the hotel property under a new
name but continued to display certain Choice Hotels trademarks and
signs.353 When Goldmark failed to remove two Choice Hotels signs,
Choice Hotels sued Goldmark under the Lanham Act as well as under
Texas law for common law trademark infringement and unfair
competition.354
Although the district court granted Choice Hotels’s motion for sum-
mary judgment for liability on all its claims, the district court rejected
Choice Hotels’ request for a permanent injunction, finding that certain
disputed issues of material fact still existed.355 To obtain permanent in-
junctive relief, Choice Hotels had to establish each of the following
factors:
(1) a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits; (2) a
substantial threat that it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction
is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury to Choice Hotels out-
weighs the threatened harm . . . to Goldmark; and (4) that granting
the preliminary injunction would not disserve the public interest.356
While Choice Hotels could establish actual success on the merits (as evi-
denced by the court’s earlier findings), the district court found that
Choice Hotels could not carry the heavy burden of supporting its request
for a permanent injunction.357 The district court held that Choice Hotels
failed to prove that it faced a substantial threat of irreparable injury be-
cause Goldmark had covered up the disputed signs, removed other signs
or paraphilia containing Choice Hotels’s marks, and generally presented
itself as an establishment not owned by Choice Hotels.358 The district
court found that these issues precluded Choice Hotels’s summary judg-
ment request for injunctive relief.359
Similarly, the district court held that Choice Hotels was not entitled to
monetary damages because disputed issues of material fact remained.360
While Choice Hotels sought Goldmark’s profits during the time of in-
fringement, Choice Hotels disputed the loss and accounting statement
350. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Goldmark Hosp., LLC, No. 3:12-CV-0548-D, 2014 WL




354. Id. at *1–2.
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357. Id. at *12.
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359. Id.
360. Id. at *12–13.
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that summarized Goldmark’s profits.361 Choice Hotels also sought actual
damages in the form of reasonable royalties due under the franchise
agreement.362 Contrary to Goldmark’s arguments, the district court held
that Choice Hotels could obtain royalty payments from Goldmark, de-
spite the fact that Goldmark had not previously entered into a licensing
agreement with Choice Hotels.363 The district court, however, ultimately
held that Choice Hotels was not entitled to actual damages because it had
not clearly established the royalty rate that should be used.364
Choice Hotels stands as another example of a case in which the court
granted summary judgment as to liability, but denied summary judgment
as to the remedies because it found that disputed issues of material fact
remain.365 Further, Choice Hotels is notable because the defendant was
not a former franchisee, but rather the owner of a foreclosure deed on a
property previously operated under a franchise. In this situation, where a
defendant violates infringement statutes as a matter of circumstance and
without intending to do so, a franchisor may face difficulties in obtaining
injunctive or monetary remedies on summary judgment.
C. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Meltzer/Austin Restaurant Corp. v. Benihana National Corp. addressed
the question of whether a franchisor could recover attorneys’ fees based
on a provision requiring that the franchisee pay for costs incurred in en-
forcing the franchise agreement.366 This case involved three separate suits
based on Meltzer’s franchise agreements with Benihana, which were later
consolidated in the Western District of Texas.367 Only one set of claims by
Meltzer’s San Antonio business survived until trial, where a jury ruled in
Benihana’s favor.368 Benihana then sought to recover attorneys’ fees in-
curred in bringing suit against Meltzer in Florida as well as defending
against Meltzer’s suit in Texas.369 Benihana relied on a provision in the
franchise agreement that obligated Meltzer to pay all costs, including at-
torneys’ fees, incurred by Benihana “in connection with the enforce-
ment” of certain sections of the agreement related to the franchisee’s
covenants and to the use of Benihana’s intellectual property and confi-
dential information.370 Whether such contractual language obligated
Meltzer to pay Benihana’s attorneys’ fees in the initiation and defense of
361. Id. at *13.
362. Id. at *13–14.
363. Id. at *14; see also id. (citing Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem
Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“[A] prior licensing arrangement is not a prerequi-
site to using a reasonable royalty method to calculate damages.”).
364. Id.
365. See also Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Patel, 940 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
366. Meltzer/Austin Rest. Corp. v. Benihana Nat’l Corp., No. A-11-CV-542-AWA, 2014
WL 7157110, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2014). Haynes and Boone, LLP served as counsel
for Benihana National Corporation in this matter.
367. Id. at *1.
368. Id.
369. Id. at *2.
370. Id.
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suits depended on the definition of “enforcement,” which the franchise
agreement did not define.371
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas held that
Meltzer was not required to pay Benihana’s attorneys’ fees incurred in
defending against Meltzer’s suit, pointing to various cases in which courts
interpreted similar contractual language.372 Specifically, the district court
pointed to cases that drew a distinction between a proactive stance (e.g.
suing to compel a covenant or enforce a right) and a defensive stance
(e.g. defending against a claim based on an agreement) and held that en-
forcement of an agreement fell only into the former category.373 Ulti-
mately, because enforcement did not include defense of a suit and
Benihana had failed to include explicit language stating, the district court
found that Benihana could not recover the attorneys’ fees incurred in
defending itself against Meltzer’s suit.374 The district court, however, held
that Benihana was entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing suit
against Meltzer in Florida because that action sought to enforce certain
provisions of the franchise agreement.375
The Meltzer/Austin Restaurant holding emphasizes the importance of
drafting contractual language in a precise manner. In cases where courts
have expanded the definition of “enforcement” to include the defense of
an action, they have relied on other language in the agreement to guide
their interpretation.376 For example, one federal district court awarded
attorneys’ fees incurred in defense of a suit where the agreement required
payment for attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the enforcement
and protection of the agreement, because the court interpreted “protec-
tion” to include defense of a suit.377 Because drafters are capable of writ-
ing clauses that explicitly award attorneys’ fees in certain situations,
courts generally do not interpret enforcement to mean anything beyond
“to enforce.”378
VII. CONCLUSION
This Survey period not only witnessed the Texas courts continuing to
define procedural and substantive issues in the franchising context, but it
also saw the Texas Legislature take affirmative steps to limit a
franchisor’s exposure to vicarious liability under the joint employer doc-
trine in response to recent National Labor Relations Board decisions.
371. Id. at *3.
372. Id. at *2–4 (citing Hous. Auth. of Champaign Cnty. v. Lyles, 918 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2009); Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Gadsy v.
Am. Golf Corp. of Cal., No. 2:10-cv-680-FtM-38CM, 2014 WL 5473555, at *5 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 28, 214)).
373. See id. at *3–4.
374. Id. at *4.
375. Id. at *4–5.
376. Id. at *3.
377. Id. (citing Bank of Am., N.A. v. Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d
1092 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2014)).
378. Id. at *4.
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Procedurally, Great American and SGIC remind franchisors that the
requirements to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant remain
relatively stringent, and Aguayo and Pacheco provide worthwhile distinc-
tions for applying the relatively low requirements for certifying a pro-
posed class. Gator Apple, Pritchett, Yumilicious I, and Yumilicious II
emphasize the importance of timing and intent behind franchise agree-
ments as it relates to choice-of-law, forum selection clauses incorporated
by reference, jury waivers in guaranty agreements, and statute of limita-
tion issues related to DTPA counterclaims. In addition to cautioning
franchisors that arbitration exemptions should be explicitly identified and
should include specific language in the franchise agreement, DXP and
Allee demonstrate Texas courts’ inclination to enforce arbitration clauses
that are reasonably broad in scope.
Although New York Pizzeria appears, at first glance, to weaken a
franchisor’s trademark protection of distinctive food flavors and trade
dress protection for plating of dishes, the case underscores the impor-
tance of protecting recipes and other cooking secrets through effective
nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements.
Texas law imposes extra-contractual duties of good faith and fair deal-
ing where there is a special relationship between the parties. But Texas
courts have found no special relationship between parties to a franchise
agreement. Williamson-Dickie further notes that the implied covenant
does not exist in a trademark license agreement since a licensor-licensee
relationship is substantially similar to the franchisor-franchisee relation-
ship. Accordingly, there can be no claim for tortious interference with
prospective business when the conduct complained of is an alleged
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Further, in the tort context, Yumilicious III stands for the proposition
that the economic loss rule precludes recovery for fraud and misrepresen-
tation claims tied directly to a franchise agreement. BP Automotive holds
that filing an application for a franchise, presumably to compete with a
competitor’s application, does not constitute a prohibited act. Nor is the
application an “existing contract” sufficient for a claim of tortious inter-
ference with existing contract.
Most notably, the Texas Legislature limited a franchisor’s exposure to
liability for claims made by a franchisee’s employees. By restricting a
franchisor’s status as an employer or joint employer over those employ-
ees, a franchisor will be liable only if it exercises direct control over the
employees beyond what is necessary to protect its brand. In Domino’s,
the court of appeals fleshed out the “control” element for analyzing vica-
rious liability in the franchising context and focused specifically on the
franchise agreement. In addition, EEOC v. Simbaki makes it clear that
franchisors should pay particular attention to any Title VII allegations
because the named-party requirement may not ultimately be a defense to
liability.
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Yumilicious II reminds franchisors that the mere nondisclosure of ma-
terial information does not give rise to an actionable DTPA claim and
that technical violations of the Franchise Rule will not support a DTPA
without evidence of intent or detrimental reliance. And in the bankruptcy
context, Pizza Patron suggests indemnification or subrogation claims may
qualify as non-dischargeable debt even if the debt is based on liability
from a third-party’s fraud claim, a holding that adheres to the general
policy of protecting an honest but unfortunate debtor. Furthermore, In re
Simbaki highlights how bankruptcy courts in this jurisdiction are reluc-
tant to dismiss a Chapter 11 case if creditors participate in the reorganiza-
tion process, even if the debtor and the court miss statutory deadlines to
file and confirm the reorganization plan.
Finally, with respect to remedies, Yumilicious III serves as a reminder
to personal guarantors of a franchise to carefully review both the
franchise and guaranty agreements for waiver provisions because the
right to recover consequential or punitive damages can be waived. Choice
Hotels clarifies that summary judgment as to liability does not automati-
cally result in summary judgment as to remedies where disputed issues of
material fact remain, and injunctive relief may be especially difficult in
the foreclosure context where a defendant has no intent to violate an
infringement statute. Franchise attorneys should thoroughly examine
Meltzer and its implicit instruction to precisely draft attorneys’ fees provi-
sions in franchise agreements. By avoiding seemingly ambiguous phrases,
such as the “enforcement of the franchise agreement,” drafters can en-
sure that attorneys’ fees are awarded in specific situations.
